Core
corroborated discovery
Turning a registry from an authority you trust into a source you can audit — by asking multiple independent registries the same question and treating any disagreement as a signal.
the quilt
The fabric of independent registries and name services an agent can be found through — the NANDA Index, AgentFacts, ANS, DNS-AID, and others. Broad enough to be resilient, so broad it must check itself.
sweep
One corroboration pass: for each subject in a watch set, query every configured source the same way, from every vantage, classify each answer, and diff the claims.
Corroboration Record
The atomic verifiable object: a signed, content-addressed verdict about one subject, carrying
subject, observed_at, the per-source per-vantage claims, the verdict, the findings, a staleness_window, and the sweeping_party_identity — Ed25519 over the JCS-canonical body, re-verifiable offline. Implemented by sm-divergence.verdict (AGREE / DIVERGENT / INSUFFICIENT)
The result of a sweep for one subject.
AGREE: two or more decisive sources concur. DIVERGENT: they disagree — a finding is raised. INSUFFICIENT: fewer than two decisive claims to compare.claim status (present / absent / error)
How one source's answer is classified.
present: it serves the record. absent: it positively denies it. error: it failed to answer — no claim either way, never counted as a denial.vantage
The observation context a source is asked from — the conditions the answer was obtained under, not the machine that asked. Written
class:value from a controlled set (region:de, asn:as64500), so two sweepers mean the same thing by the same label. A source that answers differently across vantages is equivocating unless it declared that it would; the axis exists so intra-source disagreement is attributed correctly.known subject
A subject whose identity (an agent name, an email, a DID, a workload identifier) the discovering entity already knows before resolution begins. "Known" does not mean trusted. The registry-assisted resolution profile resolves known subjects only; it is not search.
Resolution Registry
A registry implementing the known-subject resolution profile:
POST /resolve, one hop, returning a terminal target — never another registry — with provenance, authority evidence, and a renewable binding. To The Quilt it is one source among the quilt.binding / lease sequence
A registry's subject-to-target association issued as a renewable lease: a
sequence that increases, within one authority scope, whenever the target, publisher or authority evidence changes, plus expiresAt and revocation information. Sequences compare only within one scope. Distinct from the agent's own self-description seq.authority scope / issuer
The issuer that validated the subject for a binding — a registry's domain-control check, an account provider's assertion. The space a sequence counts in, and provenance for the record. Never a compared field: two registries validating the same subject through different issuers is the ordinary case.
occupiable
A context a third party can construct and observe from itself. Region and network are occupiable: a verifier can go there and repeat the observation. Caller identity, tenant, and subscription tier are not — a declaration about one could only be believed, so it is refused.
Findings
omission
A subject one source serves and another confirms absent — a record hidden by a registry that chose not to serve it.
endpoint divergence
Sources agree a subject exists but claim different (unsigned) endpoints for it — the tampering signal.
digest divergence
Sources agree on a subject's endpoint but not on the integrity digest of what it serves (
targetDigest). The registries are honest; the host is serving two documents. Compared only when both sides carry a digest.stale binding
A source serving a binding whose lease sequence is below the current one in the same authority scope. Attributed to that source and withheld from the field comparison — being behind is not disagreeing. A finding (
DIVERGENT), suspected inside the staleness window, confirmed past it; its identity is the source and scope, never the sequence numbers.DID divergence
Sources serve different valid attestations whose key identities (DIDs) disagree — identity equivocation, the thing DID pinning defends against.
source equivocation
A single source whose own answers, seen from different vantages, contradict each other — proof it is telling different callers different things.
declared divergence
A difference a source had published an Answer Scope for, in advance, on an occupiable context. The finding is still raised and the verdict is unchanged — the declaration annotates it and records which revision was matched. It never withdraws a finding.
scope violation
A source varying a field contrary to a scope it had itself published — a rule published and broken, which is a stronger accusation than an undeclared difference. Specified in
-01; it may not be raised without evidence the scope predates the observation, and nothing in the reference implementation establishes that yet.confirmation (suspected / confirmed)
A finding is
suspected when first seen and confirmed once re-observed past the staleness window, so legitimate propagation delay is not mistaken for a lie.Primitives
Answer Scope
A source-signed bundle declaring which fields it varies and along which context class. It declares an axis, never a mapping: "endpoint varies by region" can be checked by observing from another region, whereas "EU callers get X" is a promise about values made by the party doing the varying.
sm-bridge
The discovery on-ramp — bidirectional interop across the NANDA Index, ANS, and DNS-AID — that reaches the sources a sweep compares.
sm-resolver
The source-agnostic corroboration kernel: the
Resolver and View contract, a pure diff, and the Corroborator.sm-divergence
Divergence detection and the signed Corroboration Record; the reference implementation of
draft-chandra-agent-registry-corroboration (-02, 30 Oct 2026; 0.12.0). Ships the KnownSubjectResolver.KnownSubjectResolver
The thin adapter that reaches a Resolution Registry: one
POST /resolve, maps the target to the view (targetUrl → endpoint, targetDigest → digest, sequence + issuer → lease position), classifies expired, revoked and registry-as-target responses as error with an outcome that says why. Never evaluates authority evidence; never follows a target to another registry.